Experiments
What we tried, what actually happened, and what it means for defenders.
RESEARCH
We research the seams — where software, infrastructure, identity and security controls meet, and where a low-risk finding becomes a real exploit path. We publish experiments, exploit-chain postmortems, benchmarks and control failures, with primary-source citations.
What we tried, what actually happened, and what it means for defenders.
How mediums compose into a critical path — de-identified.
Harder measures that punish hallucinated exploitability.
Where a WAF, IAM rule or endpoint control broke a path — or failed to.

Coding agents changed the repository threat model: configuration, hooks, instructions and tool definitions can influence privileged agent behavior.
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MCP security is not mainly a prompt-filtering problem. Once an agent can call tools with real credentials, the useful threat model is identity + authorization + untrusted input + execution.
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Real attack paths cross code, identity, infrastructure, controls and organization-specific rules. Product security needs a full-system model.
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Autonomous offensive security is attracting serious capital. The durable product is not another alert generator---it is defensible exploit evidence and re-test.
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